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Should Tort Damages be Multiplied?
Keith N. Hylton
Boston University School of Law
Thomas J. Miceli
University of Connecticut

The notion that damages should be multiplied bythe reciprocal of the probability
of punishment is one of the basic lessons of the law and economics literature.
However, the simple l/p" multiplier turns out be inapplicable in the civil damages setting. The multiplier that brings about first-best deterrence must be chosen by striking a balance between the supply of lawsuits and the need to
internalize costs. Moreover, given the costs of litigation, a multiplier that minimizes overall social costs (in contrast to achieving first-best deterrence) may
need to be set at a level that effectively bars many claims. This article derives
optimal damage multipliers for a costly civil litigation system and examines the
conflicting implications of deterrence and social cost minimization as objectives
in the design of an optimal multiplier. An empirical application suggests that the
first-best deterrence multiplier for the tort system is roughly equal to two.

1. Introduction
The notion that damages should be multiplied to make up for uncertainty in
punishment has been around at least since Bentham (1781). The traditional
account of the optimal multiplier is straightforward: if p is the probability
of liability, then 1lp is the multiplier that should be applied to the damage
judgment. If damages are multiplied by l/p, then the injurer's expected damage judgment will internalize the social loss due to his conduct.
This simple notion of the optimal multiplier has been developed farther in the
law enforcement context starting with Becker (1968) and later refinements
(Polinsky and Shavell, 1979).' However, no one has worked out the optimal
damage multiplier for the private litigation context. That is the goal of this article.
To be precise, this article has two goals. First, it seeks to derive optimal
damage multipliers for a costly legal system. Second, it aims to examine
the conflicting implications of deterrence and social cost minimization as
objectives in the design of an optimal multiplier.

We thank Yulia Rodionova for excellent research assistance.
1. For criticism of the multiplier policy from a behavioral perspective, see Sunstein, Schkade,
and Kahneman (2000).
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The first goal, the specification of the optimal damage multiplier, is easy to
justify and presumably uncontroversial. Several recent articles have approached
the optimal multiplier issue from various perspectives. Polinsky and Shavell
(1998), examining punitive damages, argue that the optimal damage multiplier
is simply the reciprocal of the probability of liability. Their analysis, consistent
with Bentham (1781), sees multiplying damages by the reciprocal of the probability of liability as necessary to offset the dilution in deterrence that results
from uncertainty in the imposition of liability. Easterbrook (1985) argues that
the uncertainty in detection provides the only good rationale for multiplying
antitrust damages. Craswell (1999) shows that the effects of uncertain liability
on deterrence are complicated, diluting deterrence in some instances while
enhancing deterrence in others, and concludes that there is no general case
for multiplying damage awards by a factor greater than one. Though coming
from different perspectives, these articles are consistent with the traditional
approach that takes uncertainty in enforcement as the key determinant of the
optimal multiplier-that is, the "lp"approach to the optimal multiplier.
However, there are drawbacks in the lip approach to the multiplier. While it
may be useful in Becker's law enforcement context to treat the probability of
apprehension (a component of the probability of punishment) as uniform and
exogenous, this approach is less useful in the litigation context. The probability
of litigation (a component of the probability of liability) differs among classes
of litigant (securities, class actions, malpractice) and probably within each
class, depending on the relationship between the expected award and the cost
of litigation (Shavell, 1982b). An implementable approach to optimal damage
multipliers should be capable of specifying the functional relationship between
the probability of litigation, on the one hand, and variables such as the
expected award and cost of litigation on the other. Moreover, in view of this
relationship, the multiplier should be set in a way that balances the supply of
lawsuits with the need for internalization. For example, if initially only 1 out of
10 injury victims sue, and setting the multiplier at 10 results in all victims
suing, costs would be overinternalized, because everyone would collect 10
times damages. In short, rather than treating the probability of liability as exogenous, an optimal damages framework should2 treat it as endogenous, as
a function of the factors that determine liability.
In this article, uncertainty in the imposition of liability is not exogenous. It
results from the fact that litigation is costly. We do not assume that the plaintiff
has difficulty in detecting the injurer. Rather, some victims fail to sue in this
model because litigation is costly, an inescapable fact of the real world.3
2. Using this information, a punishing authority could specify optimal multipliers for different
classes of litigant.
3. Although we assume detection is certain, the uncertain detection model can be viewed as
a special case of the model in this article. Uncertain detection is a special case of the litigation cost
model in which the victim must incur some cost in order to detect the injurer. The perspective
adopted here is arguably more general. Taking litigation costs into account naturally generates
uncertainty in litigation. Moreover, in view ofthe importance of litigation costs, any serious effort
to specify optimal damage awards should take them into account.
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The term "litigation cost" should be understood broadly to cover all costs
that might deter some victims from filing suit. This includes the cost of paying for an attorney, and less obviously the opportunity cost of time absorbed
by litigation, the psychological stress of litigation, and the costs that result
because litigation tends to rupture certain relationships (e.g., employer and
employee).
The second goal of this article, to examine the conflicting implications of
deterrence and social cost minimization, is intended to provoke debate or at
least to raise questions. We distinguish two types of optimal multiplier, an
optimally deterring (or optimal deterrence) multiplier and a socially optimal
multiplier. The optimally deterring multiplier brings about first-best deterrence, given costly litigation. In other words, if the injurer's failure to take
care imposes a loss of $1200 on society, which is the sum of a direct harm
to the victim of $1000 and the victim's expected litigation cost of $200, then
the optimally deterring multiplier induces the injurer to take care whenever his
cost of care is less than $1200. Alternatively, one can say that the optimally
deterring multiplier treats the victim's lawsuit as a natural by-product of the4
injury and seeks to internalize to the injurer the full social costs of his conduct.
In contrast, the socially optimal multiplier minimizes the sum of injuries,
injury avoidance costs, and litigation costs.
We show that the optimally deterring multiplier is greater than the socially
optimal multiplier. This implies that first-best deterrence is never optimal under a multiplier regime. Moreover, we show that the optimally deterring and
socially optimal multiplier levels diverge as the cost of litigation increases.
The reason is simple. As litigation becomes more costly, the optimally deterring multiplier increases because it forces the injurer to pay for the victim's
cost of litigating, which is also increasing. In contrast, the socially optimal
multiplier declines, because as litigation becomes more expensive, it becomes less likely that the deterrence benefit provided by an additional lawsuit
will outweigh its cost. Once the deterrent value of the marginal lawsuit dips
below its cost, the social planner will set the multiplier to less than one
and may continue to push it down to zero in order to discourage additional
lawsuits.
For simplicity, we focus on the case of strict liability-we consider negligence in the appendix. 5 Since simple closed-form solutions for the two optimal
multipliers are not available, we ran simulations to compare the multipliers in
terms of their responses to changes in the ratio of damages to litigation costs.
The optimally deterring multiplier is always greater than one and grows as the
ratio of the cost of litigation to the harm increases. In contrast, the socially

4. For an intuitive, ethical argument for treating the victim's litigation cost as part of the
injurer's harm, see Abel (1987).
5. We also derive a "reasonable care multiplier" that guarantees compliance with the negligence rule in order to compare our analysis with Craswell (1999). The reasonable care multiplier
could be larger than Craswell's result because it takes litigation costs into account.
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optimal multiplier can be less than one,
and falls toward zero as the ratio of the
6
litigation cost to the harm increases.
Using data from two of the RAND Corporation's studies of civil litigation,
we made rough estimates of the optimally deterring multiplier for the tort system overall, auto torts, and medical malpractice. The data suggest that the
overall optimal deterrence multiplier should be roughly two--a "double damages" rule. The optimal deterrence multiplier for auto torts, which account for
half of the total tort claims (Kakalik and Pace, 1986), is roughly 1.5. The data
do not suggest a case, on optimal deterrence grounds, for multiplying medical
malpractice damages. Of course, these estimates should be taken as preliminary, and largely as a suggestion for future research.
In order to provide an empirical answer to the debate between Polinsky
and Shavell (1998) and Craswell (1999), we also derive a reasonable care
multiplier that guarantees compliance with a reasonable care standard (negligence). We find that the reasonable care multiplier for the overall tort system is roughly equal to one, which suggests no need to multiply damages
(by a factor either greater than or less than one) in order to achieve reasonable care.
The normative question generated by this article is whether society
should prefer the socially optimal multiplier to the optimally deterring
multiplier. While the socially optimal multiplier maximizes social wealth,
it does so, in some cases, by barring some victims from bringing suit.
The socially optimal multiplier enhances social wealth when the deterrent
value of the lawsuits that are barred is less than their additional litigation
costs. In simpler terms, the socially optimal damages regime allows injurers
to harm people without having to pay the entire cost of the harm when
the losses suffered by victims are too small to justify the expenses of a trial.
The optimally deterring multiplier does not allow this to occur: it sets the
penalty at a level that internalizes the full social costs of harmful conduct to
injurers.
The socially optimal multiplier is chosen by a social planner that seeks to
minimize social costs. An alternative approach, the Aristotelian corrective justice framework, makes the correction of wrongs the highest priority of the legal
system. The optimally deterring multiplier is chosen under any plausible
corrective justice framework.

6. We are examining the standard accident model in which lapses of care raise the likelihood of
injuries. We do not focus explicitly on intentional injuries, though one could argue that intentional
injuries are simply special cases of the model we examine. Intentional harms present a more difficult issue in the case where the injurer's conduct is inefficient under all circumstances. If the cost
ofcare for every potential injurer is always less than the expected harm to a victim, then an efficient
rule would bar the injurer's activity. Although the internalizing penalty would be sufficient as
a deterrent in this case, there is no economic reason to prefer the internalizing penalty to an even
greater penalty level (perhaps infinite) (see Becker, 1968). For an application to the litigation context, see Hylton (1998).
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2. The Conflict Between Deterrence and Social Cost Minimization: An
Example and Some Related Literature
In this section we elaborate on the relationship between the optimally deterring
damage level and the socially optimal damage level, and we show the corresponding damage multipliers. As we noted earlier, the optimally deterring
multiplier internalizes the social costs of the injurer's conduct, while the socially optimal multiplier minimizes the sum of injuries, injury avoidance costs,
and litigation costs.
To see the difference between the two, consider a simple example, based on
Shavell (1 982a). Suppose the injurer can choose to take care or not take care. If
he takes care, the probability of an injury is .25. If he does not take care, the
probability of an injury is .75. The loss to the victim is $100. The cost of taking
care is $20. Taking care is socially desirable because the total social cost when
the injurer takes case is $20 + (.25)($100) = $45, while the total social cost
when the injurer does not take case is (.75)($100) = $75.
Rather than comparing the total social cost when the injurer takes care to the
total social cost when he does not, an alternative is to compare the social benefit from care to its cost (the Hand formula approach). In this case, the social
benefit from care is the expected value of avoided harms, (.75 - .25)($ 100) =
$50, while the cost of care is $20. Since the social benefit from care exceeds
the cost of care, care is socially desirable.
However, the injurer will not take care without the threat of a lawsuit. This is
easy to see, because if the victim cannot sue to collect compensation for his
injury, the cost to the injurer of taking care is $20 and of not taking care is $0.
Since lawsuits deter careless conduct, we can say that the social benefit from
deterrence-the deterrence benefit-is the expected value of avoided harms
net the avoidance cost, $50 - $20 = $30. The cost of "deterrence" is simply
the expected total cost of litigation.
Suppose liability is strict and the cost of litigation is $61 for either party.
Since $100 > $61, the victim will definitely sue if injured. Given this, the real
social cost of failing to take care is (.75 - .25)($100 + $122) = $111. The
injurer's marginal liability, however, is (.75 - .25)($100 + $61) = $80.5.
In this case, the optimally deterring damage multiplier, m*, equals
m*($80.5) = $111, and is therefore m* = 1.38.
But is 1.38 the socially optimal level of the multiplier? Consider the total
social costs when the victim does not sue and when the victim does sue.
When the victim does not or for some reason cannot sue, the total social
cost is (.75)($100) = $75. When the victim does sue, the total social cost
is (.25)($222) + $20 = $75.5. Since society is better off if the victim does
not sue, the socially optimal multiplier, m*, should be such that
(m*)($100) < $.61, implying that m* < .61. As long as this holds, no victim will sue and society will be better off than under the regime in which
victims sue and injurers take care. As this numerical example shows, the
optimally deterring and socially optimal damage multipliers may not be the
same.
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Instead of comparing the total social cost when the litigation is permitted
and when it is not, consider comparing the deterrence benefit to the cost of
deterrence (litigation). Recall that the deterrence benefit in this case is $30.
The expected total cost of litigation is (.25)($122) = $30.5. Since the deterrence benefit is less than the cost of litigation, social costs are minimized by
prohibiting lawsuits.
For comparison, consider the corresponding additive adjustments to the
compensatory damage level. To internalize all of the victim's harm, we would
increase the victim's damage award by an amount equal to the victim's cost of
litigation, $61. This is the additive adjustment that would correspond to the
optimally deterring multiplier of 1.38. In contrast, the socially optimal additive
adjustment removes the victim's incentive to sue. Thus the socially optimal
additive adjustment in this case is to subtract some amount greater than
$39 from the victim's award.
Now, let us link this example to the literature in order to clarify this article's
contribution. Shavell (1982a) showed that the private and social incentives to
sue diverge, and thus it may be optimal to bar suits in cases where there is
a private incentive to sue. This is illustrated in our numerical example.
Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988) show that the optimal level of liability under
strict liability may be greater or less than the compensatory level, depending on
the productivity of care. The productivity of care is determined by the extent to
which care reduces the expected level of damages. If care is not sufficiently
productive, then the optimal level of liability may be less than the compensatory level. The Polinsky and Rubinfeld article can be viewed as a generalization of Shavell (1982a). The case in which it is optimal to bar some lawsuits
happens to be the case in which the marginal deterrence benefit is less than the
marginal cost of litigation (Hylton, 2002).
Indeed, if care is productive in the sense that the marginal deterrence benefit
exceeds the marginal litigation cost at levels of liability below the optimum,
the optimal damage level is equal to compensatory damages plus the victim's
cost of litigation (Hylton, 2002). If care is not productive in this sense, the
optimal damage level will be lower, and may be zero (prohibition of all lawsuits). In our numerical example, care is not productive because the deterrence
benefit is $30 and the marginal litigation cost is $30.50. The socially optimal
damage award is any level less than $61, which is obviously less than the compensatory level. Generalizing, the socially optimal and optimally deterring
damage levels will be the same when care is productive, in the sense just defined. When care is not productive, the socially optimal damage level will be
less than the optimally deterring damage level.
These results clearly have implications for optimal damage multipliers, but
they do not translate easily, thus the need for the analysis that follows. If care is
unproductive at all damages levels, then it follows from Shavell (1982a) that
lawsuits should be prohibited and the socially optimal damage multiplier is
zero. If care is productive, one simple approach is to use a multiplier equal
to the sum of the compensatory award and the cost of litigation, both divided
by the compensatory award. Thus if the compensatory award is $100, and the
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victim's cost of litigation is $20, the optimal award level could be achieved by
using a multiplier of 1.2. The drawback to this solution is that the multiplier
would be individual specific; that is, it would depend on every individual's
damage award.
We consider below uniform multipliers, which have the advantage of being
useful for comparison with statutorily set multipliers, such as the treble damages rule of antitrust. We consider both the optimally deterring and socially
optimal multipliers.
The key contributions of this article to this literature that distinguish it from
Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988) and Hylton (2002) are as follows. We show that
the socially optimal multiplier is always less than the optimally deterring multiplier, and the two diverge as the cost of litigation increases. In other words,
although the socially optimal damage level may be the same as the optimally
deterring damage level, the socially optimal and optimally deterring multipliers will not be the same. It follows that first-best deterrence is never socially
optimal in the standard multiplier regime. In addition to this result, we explore
its implications for the literature on optimal multipliers under negligence
(Craswell, 1999). We also examine empirical algorithms for determining
optimal multipliers.

3. The Model
All injurers and victims are risk neutral, and only injurers can take care to
reduce the risk of an accident. 7 (Thus the model is one of unilateral care.)
If an injurer takes care, the probability of an accident is q, while if he does
not take care, the probability isp, wherep > q > 0. Let x be the injurer's cost
of care, which will generally vary across injurers.
The dollar loss to victims in the event of an accident is v, which is unaffected
by the injurer's care choice but varies across victims. Injurers do not know the
value of a particular victim's v, but they know its distribution across the population of potential victims, which is given by H(v). Thus the expected damage
that a randomly chosen victim will experience in the event of an accident is

E(v) =

j

vdH(v).

(1)

Both injurers and victims incur a cost if the victim of an accident files a suit for
damages. Let c, be the victim's cost of filing suit, and let ci be the injurer's cost
of trial.
The presence of litigation costs results in underdeterrence under both strict
liability and negligence rules (HyJton, 1990b). Strict liability underdeters for
two reasons. First, victims whose damages are less than the cost of filing suit
(i.e., those for whom v < c,) do not file, so injurers ignore those damages, and
7. The model is based on Hylton (1990a,b).
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second, injurers do not account for the litigation costs of those victims who
do file suit.
For simplicity, we will focus on strict liability in the text and deal with the
negligence case in the appendix. We will first derive the optimally deterring
(or full internalization) multiplier, and then the socially optimal multiplier.
3.1 Optimally Deterring Multiplier
Let md be the optimally deterring multiplier under strict liability. Thus an
accident victim will file suit if mdv > c,,, or if
v > c5 /ma.

(2)

It follows that, in the event of an accident, the probability of a suit is 1 - H(cvl
md). The injurer's expected cost of taking care is thus
x+q f

(mdv
+ ci)dH(v),

(3)

while his expected cost of not taking care is

P

d
(m

(4)

+ ci)dH(v).

The injurer will take care if Equation (3) is less than Equation (4), or if

X < (p

q) j

(mdv
+ ci)dH(v).

(5)

Now consider the social condition for care. If the injurer takes care, the
expected social costs are

x + q{E(v) + [1 - H(Cv/md)1(ci + cv)}.

(6)

The expected social costs if the injurer does not take care are
p{E(v) + [1 -

H(cv/ma)](ci + cv)}.

(7)

Care is socially desirable if Equation (6) is less than Equation (7), or if
x < (p - q){E(v) + [1 - H(cv/md)](ci + cv)}.

(8)

Comparing Equations (5) and (8) shows that when ma = 1, strict liability
underdeters for the reasons noted above.
Optimal deterrence is achieved by setting md such that the right-hand sides
of Equations (5) and (8) are equal. After some manipulation, we obtain the
following equation for md:
md f/
al(9

(V-

) dH(v)

Ev ,.

(9,
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F(md)

E(v)

Md *M

d

Figure 1. Optimal deterrence multiplier.

Call the left-hand side of this equation
F'

=

F(md).

Note that F(O)

-

0

and
(10)

vdH(v) > 0.

The determination of the optimal value of the multiplier, denoted m*, is shown
graphically in Figure 1. Note that since
F(1) =

(v - cv)dH(v) < E(v),

(11)

it follows that m* > 1 for c,. > 0. Further,
OF
c- =_[1 -H(cv/md)]

< 0,

(12)

which implies that, as expected, m* is increasing in cv.
To gain an intuitive sense of the function of the optimally deterring multiplier, note that Equation (9) can also be expressed as
Md-

E(v) + [1 - H(cv/md)]cv
f'_/m. vdH(v)

(13)

Of course, this is not a reduced form, since the right-hand side is a function of
Md. However, it is clear, as was the case with Equation (9), that the optimal

multiplier m* > 1.8 This is due to two factors: (1) injurers ignore victims' litigation costs (captured by the second term in the numerator), and (2) not all
8. Moreover, one can show that there is a unique optimal multiplier, based on Equation (13). To
see this, let Z(md) represent the right-hand side of Equation (13). The sign of Z'(md) is equal to the
sign of {Md - Z(md)}. Thus, ifmd < Z(md), Z(md) is decreasing. This gives a unique fixed point
m*.We will take advantage of this property in our discussion of empirical implications.
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victims file suit (captured by the fact that the denominator is less than E(v)).
The optimal deterrence multiplier is equal to the ratio of the total loss suffered
by victims to the portion of the injury loss compensated through litigation.
Since litigating victims will be compensated for their losses, the denominator
cancels when multiplied by the average compensatory award, and the numerator guarantees full internalization of the social loss.

3.2 Socially Optimal Multiplier
Whereas the optimally deterring multiplier takes litigation as given and aims to
internalize all of the external costs generated by the injurer's failure to take
care, the socially optimal multiplier does not take litigation as given. The socially optimal multiplier minimizes the sum of injury costs, injury avoidance
costs, and litigation costs. If the cost of litigation exceeds its deterrence benefits, the social cost minimization approach leads to a prohibition of litigation.
Based on the informal discussion of Section 2, it is straightforward to state
the verbal formula for the socially optimal multiplier. The socially optimal
multiplier equates the marginal social benefit from deterrence with the marginal cost of litigation.
To derive the socially optimal multiplier, we will start with the objective
function. The objective can be expressed as the minimization of the sum of
injuries, injury avoidance costs, and litigation costs. Alternatively, we can express the objective as the maximization of the net social benefit from deterrence, which is the difference between the deterrence benefit and the total
litigation costs, where the deterrence benefit is equal to avoided harms net
the cost of care. To remain consistent with the discussion of Section 2, we
will use the latter expression of the objective.
Assume x, the cost of care, varies across individuals according to the
probability distribution G(x). The net social benefit from litigation can be
expressed as

G(xi) [(p - q)E(v) - E(xlx < xi)] - [G(xi)q + (I - G(x,))p]
x (1 - H(cv/m))(cv + ci),

(14)

where xi is the level of precaution cost at which the injurer is indifferent between taking care and not taking care. On the basis of the preceding discussion,
xi is equal to the right-hand side of Equation (5) (with a multiplier of m,). The
first expression in Equation (14) is the deterrence benefit from litigation and
the second expression is the expected cost of litigation.
The socially optimal multiplier sets the marginal deterrence benefit equal to
the marginal cost of litigation. Although there is no simple closed-form solution for the socially optimal multiplier, one can show that the socially optimal
multiplier satisfies
Gm(xi)(p - q)[E(v) + (1 - H(c5 /m))cv - (1 -

H(cv/ms))nE(vlv

> Cv/ms)] = -Hm(cv/ms)[G(xi)q + (I - G(xi))p](c1 + ci),

(15)
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where the subscript m denotes the derivative with respect to that variable. The
left-hand side is the change in the probability an injurer takes care (as the multiplier increases) multiplied by the difference between the externalized loss for
each injury and the internalized portion of that loss. As long as this expression
is positive, the deterrence benefit from an additional lawsuit is positive. The
right-hand side, which is positive, is the change in the probability of a lawsuit
multiplied by the expected cost of litigation.
The social optimality condition suggests that the multiplier level is not increased to the point that the social gains from deterrence are exhausted. Indeed,
the following proposition is implied.
Proposition 1. In a costly legal system, the socially optimal multiplier is
less than the optimally deterring multiplier. In other words, the socially optimal level of the multiplier will not internalize all of the social costs of the
injurer's conduct. This implies that first-best deterrence is never optimal under
a multiplier regime.
This follows from observing the left-hand side of the optimality condition.
Exhausting deterrence gains would require setting the left-hand side equal to
zero, which results in the multiplier expression in Equation (13); that is, the
optimally deterring multiplier. Since Equation (15) implies that the left-hand
side must be positive, m, must be less than the expression in Equation (13), all
else being equal. It follows then that9 the socially optimal multiplier is less than
the optimally deterring multiplier.
This result differs from the case of an additive adjustment to damages-that
is, where the damage award is increased by the addition of some fixed amount.
In that case, the condition that determines the socially optimal level of
liability equating the marginal deterrence benefit of additional liability to
the marginal litigation cost-happens to be satisfied when the additive adjustment is equal to the victim's cost of litigation (Hylton, 2002). The reason for
this is that all victims sue when the damage award is equal to the victim's loss
plus the victim's cost of litigation. Since all victims sue, all social costs are
internalized and the marginal deterrence benefit is driven to zero. In addition,
the marginal litigation cost is driven to zero, because when every victim sues,
increasing liability will not increase the probability of an additional lawsuit.
The full internalization or first-best deterrence outcome will never be socially optimal in the multiplier context. The reason is that one never reaches
the point at which every victim has an incentive to file suit. For example, if
the cost of litigation is $100 and the multiplier is set at 100, victims who

9. Intuitively, one might think that it could be socially optimal to overdeter in order to save
litigation costs. This reasoning would lead one to set the multiplier above the optimal deterrence
level in the hope that the reduction in litigation costs would exceed the cost ofoverdeterrence. This
intuition is wrong, and to see why consider the following argument. Suppose the multiplier is
already at the optimal deterrence level. Increasing it slightly does little to change the deterrence
level, but increases litigation costs.
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suffer a loss of less than $1 will not have an incentive to bring suit under the
multiplier regime. Increasing the multiplier, therefore, always encourages additional litigation. Since the marginal litigation effect of increasing the multiplier is always positive, the socially optimal multiplier will never be set at a
level that exhausts the social benefits from deterrence.

3.3 Model Simulation
The equations derived in the previous section of this article do not yield simple
closed-form solutions for the optimal multiplier expressions. We therefore ran
simulations of the model in order to see how the optimal deterrence and socially optimal multipliers behave as the ratio of damages to litigation costs
changes. We assumed that the distribution of precaution costs, G(x), and
the distribution of losses, H(v), were both exponential probability functions.
The exponential parameter for H, ).,,, was assumed to be one in the two simulations we ran. The exponential parameter for G, 4g, was assumed to be one
for the first simulation and four for the second. Since the exponential parameter
is equal to the reciprocal of the mean of the distribution, our assumption regarding 2 h is equivalent to assuming that the average injury loss is $1 in both
simulations. For precaution costs, we assumed an average of $1 in the first
simulation and $0.25 for the second. In addition, we assumed that the probability of loss when the injurer does not take care is .80, and the probability of
loss when the injurer does take care is .20. Under these assumptions, the
average avoided loss due to caretaking is (.8 - .2)($1) = $0.6.
The simulation results appear in Figure 2. The horizontal axis shows the
levels at which the cost of litigation was set. For example, 2 on the horizontal
axis means that c, = ci = $2. Since the average injury loss is $1, one can interpret the points on the horizontal axis as the ratio of the cost of the suit to
the average injury loss.
Figure 2 shows that the optimal deterrence multiplier starts at a value
slightly greater than one (for c, > 0) and increases with a slope of roughly
1.6 as the ratio of litigation costs to the average injury loss increases. In contrast, the socially optimal multipliers increase initially and then decrease as the
cost of litigation increases. This is an intuitive result, given that the difference
between the marginal deterrence benefit and the marginal litigation cost
decreases as the cost of litigation increases.
Figure 2 also shows that as caution becomes more productive (because the
difference between the average injury loss and average precaution cost
increases), the socially optimal multiplier increases. This is also intuitive, because as caution becomes more productive, the potential social gain from
liability increases.
Although the socially optimal multiplier values shown in Figure 2 do not
increase much above 2, we obtained larger values by running the simulation
with smaller values for the average cost of precaution (e.g., )g = 8). Still, in all
of the simulations we observed the same pattern as shown in Figure 2 an
initial increase in the socially optimal multiplier followed by a decrease.
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Figure 2. Simulated values of socially optimal and optimally-deterring multipliers.

4. Extensions
4.1 Strict Liability versus Negligence Multipliers
To this point we have dealt with strict liability. The results can be extended to
the negligence rule, which (under the Hand rule) holds the injurer liable only if
the injurer failed to take care and the injurer's cost of precaution is less than the
avoidable expected harm (i.e., x < (p - q)E(v)).1 0 The negligence case is
interesting because one can argue that most legal standards rely on principles
of "reasonableness" that are captured in the negligence test (Craswell, 1999).
We can show that the optimally deterring multiplier under negligence is
greater than the optimally deterring multiplier under strict liability. The explanation requires several steps (see the appendix for a formal derivation). First,
note that you need to induce overcompliance with the negligence standard in
order to guarantee first-best or optimal deterrence in the presence of costly
litigation. This is true because the Hand rule does not account for litigation
costs. First-best deterrence, given costly litigation, requires injurers to take
care whenever the cost of care is less than the sum of the avoidable expected
harm and the expected cost of litigation. This level of care is greater than that
required by the negligence standard.
Second, once the multiplier is set at a level that induces overcompliance
with the negligence standard, the only actors who will be forced to pay damages are those who have been held liable erroneously by the court. Why? All
actors for whom the cost of taking care is less than the avoidable harms will
take care in this regime, and therefore will not be held liable under the negligence standard. The only actors who can be held liable are those who did not
10. United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947).
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take care. Since, by assumption, we are considering the overcompliance outcome, these actors are within the group for whom the cost of care exceeds the
avoidable harms. For simplicity, let us call them "actually nonnegligent
actors." Actually nonnegligent actors will be held liable (deemed negligent)
under the negligence standard only when the court errs.
Third, since the actually nonnegligent actors are the marginal actors in this
regime, the multiplier must be set to induce first-best care on their part. This
can be accomplished by making them pay, in expectation, the same amount as
would the marginal actor under strict liability. But they will be held liable only
in the instances in which the court commits a "false conviction" (type 2 error).
In order to bring about first-best deterrence within this group of actors, the
optimally deterring negligence multiplier should be set equal to the strict
liability multiplier divided by the probability of a false conviction.
This appears to be a harsh remedy. Actors who comply with the law are
effectively punished because of the peculiar effect of the negligence standard.
Itprovides the right incentives to the subgroup of actors who might be held
liable under it and virtually exempts the remaining actors from liability. In
order to provide the right incentives to the remaining actors, the penalty must
be set at an extremely high level. Moreover, as courts become more accurate,
the multiplier must increase as well.ii
The remedy may not be as harsh as it first appears. Grady (1994) argues that
for cases involving nondurable precaution, the negligence standard operates in
a manner similar to strict liability. 12 If so, then the optimal deterrence multiplier under negligence will be roughly the same as that under strict liability.
As for the socially optimal multiplier under negligence, the lesson is
largely the same as that under strict liability. The same principle that determines the socially optimal multiplier under strict liability determines the socially optimal multiplier under negligence, which is to set the multiplier at
a level that equates the marginal benefit from deterrence to the marginal cost
of litigation [see Equation (15)]. Although we did not run simulations of the
socially optimal negligence multiplier, we see no reason to believe that they
would differ, in some general and important sense, from the results for the
strict liability multiplier. 13 On the one hand, the marginal deterrence benefit
from increasing the multiplier is diminished in the negligence case because,
as the multiplier increases, compliance with the negligence standard increases, reducing the likelihood of a plaintiff victory and dampening the
11. For example, if courts are so accurate that the probability of a false conviction is only 2%,
then the optimally deterring multiplier under negligence is 50 times the optimally deterring multiplier under strict liability.
12. The reason is that courts are incapable, in thenondurable precaution context, of determining whether the defendant's precaution was efficient in the typical case and thus the probability of
a false conviction is high. Ifa driver who should look at the road fourtimes every minute looks only
twice during one minute and causes an accident, it would be impossible for a court to determine
whether the driver's overall level of care was efficient.
13. Shavell (1982a) observed that the divergence between the private and social incentive to
sue under negligence is similar to that under strict liability.
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incentive to file a claim. For the same reason, the marginal cost of litigation
should be diminished in the negligence case, that is, the effect of an increase
in the multiplier is partially offset by the reduction in the probability of
a plaintiff victory. Since both the marginal benefit and marginal cost functions shift down as one switches from strict liability to negligence, it is difficult to predict any clear change in the level of the socially optimal
multiplier.

4.2 Compliance versus Optimal Deterrence
Once we start to think about optimal multipliers in the negligence context, one
question we immediately confront is whether we should shift our focus from
optimal care to compliance with the law. In real courts, people are concerned
about whether the actor complied with the legal standard, not whether his care
was socially optimal. For simplicity, we will refer to compliance with the negligence standard as reasonable care.
It is easy to determine the damage multiplier that guarantees reasonable care
under strict liability. Actors will exercise reasonable care under strict liability
if the expected litigation cost of the injurer equals the expected losses of victims who fail to bring suit. If the expected litigation cost of the injurer equals
the expected losses of nonsuing victims, then lawsuits effectively internalize
the direct losses suffered by victims, which induces reasonable care on the part
of injurers. In this case, the multiplier that guarantees reasonable care under
strict liability is equal to one. If the expected litigation cost of the injurer is less
than the expected loss of nonsuing victims, then the multiplier that guarantees
reasonable care under strict liability will be greater than one, and vice versa.
14
If i, represents the reasonable care multiplier, then under strict liability,
E(v) - [1 - H(cv/mc)]ci
- H(c5 /m,)]E(vlv > cv)(

(16)

S[1

This equation suggests that the reasonable care multiplier under strict liability
can be interpreted as the ratio of "total losses not internalized by the injurer's
own litigation costs" to "loss internalized through lawsuits." To simplify, we
will refer to this as the injurer's cost internalization ratio. From the foregoing,
we know that strict liability leads to reasonable (less than reasonable) (greater
than reasonable) care when the injurer's cost internalization ratio is equal to
(greater than) (less than) one.
Now, consider the negligence rule. As Craswell (1999) suggests, it is not
clear that we need to multiply damages by a factor greater than one in order
to guarantee compliance. The reason is that the negligence rule already has
a built-in multiplier. Whereas the incremental harm risk connected to the
14. Equation (16) is obtained by equating the right-hand side of Equation (5) with (p - q)E(v)
and solving for m. It should be clear that the reasonable care multiplier under strict liability is less
than the optimally deterring multiplier in Equation (13).
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injurer's conduct is p - q, the incremental liability risk under negligence, in
the absence of judicial error, is p. Since, under negligence, the incremental
liability risk is usually greater than the incremental harm risk, the negligence
standard operates as if it multiplied damages in each case. This suggests that
the multiplier necessary for reasonable care may be less than one under the
negligence rule.
Of course, in the negligence setting, one has to make sure that the multiplier
is at least at the level that induces care on the part of those for whom the cost of
care is less than avoidable losses (x < (p - q)E(v)). At the same time, the
multiplier must be less than the level that induces care on the part of those
for whom the cost of care exceeds avoidable losses (x > (p - q)E(i')). In other
words, we are interested in lower and upper bounds on a multiplier that would
guarantee reasonable care under the negligence standard.
If we let w be the probability the injurer will be found negligent, 01 be the
probability of a false finding of nonnegligence (or type 1 error), and 02 be the
probability of a false finding of negligence (or type 2 error), then the lower
that guarantees reasonable care under negligence is
bound on the multiplier
15
determined by
M

(p

E(v) - [1 - H(c,.1/wmc)]ci
[1 - H(cv/wmc)]E(vlv > cv/wmc) Vo(1-

- q
)
0) - q02 "

(17)

The last term in Equation (17) is the ratio of the incremental harm risk to
the incremental liability risk, which is likely to be less than one, as argued
in Craswell (1999). The minimum reasonable care multiplier under negligence
is the product of the injurer's cost internalization ratio and the ratio of incremental harm risk to incremental liability risk.
This implies that the minimum reasonable care multiplier under negligence
could be greater or less than the result suggested in Craswell, depending on
whether the injurer's cost internalization ratio is greater or less than one. It also
suggests that if the injurer's litigation cost internalizes victim losses to the
same degree as it does under strict liability, then the minimum multiplier
necessary to guarantee reasonable care under negligence will be less than the
reasonable care multiplier under strict liability.

5. Empirical Application
Can we determine empirically whether damages should be multiplied, and if
so, by how much? In 1986, the RAND Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice
published a monograph titled "Costs and Compensation Paid in Tort Litigation"
(Kakalik and Pace, 1986), which includes data that could be used, in conjunction with this analysis, to get some sense of how the tort system functions as
a mechanism for internalizing the losses caused by injurers.
15. This equation is obtained by equating the right-hand side of Equation (A.3) with
(p- q)E(v) and solving for m.
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Table 1. Compensation Paid in Comparison with Total Costs of Tort Litigation
Terminated in State and Federal Courts of General Jurisdiction in 1985 (in $ Billion)
Type of expenditure
Total compensation
Total costs of litigation
Net compensation
Total expenditure

Plaintiffs

Defendants

Courts

Total

20.7-25.1
7.0-8.7
13.7-16.4
NA

20.7-25.1
8.0-10.0
NA
28.7-35.1

NA
0.5
NA
0.5

NA
15.5-19.2
13.7-16.4
29.2-35.6

Source: Kakaik, James S.,and Nicholas M Pace. 1986 Costs and Compensation Paid in Tort Litigation. R-3391-iCJ.

Santa Monica, CA:RAND Corporation, Table S.3at ix.

5.1 Overall Tort System
Table 1 shows RAND's assessment of the costs and compensation levels for
the tort system overall. The total compensation estimates shown include compensation for judgments in lawsuits and settlements of lawsuits.
The figures in Table 1 can be used as aggregate estimates for some of the
terms that appear in the various multiplier expressions derived in this article.

For example, the defendant's litigation costs can be taken as an aggregate estimate of [1 - H(cv)]ci, and the amount of compensation paid can be taken as
an estimate of the amount of the total direct injury internalized through law-

suits, [1 - H(c 1 )]E(vlv > cv).

6

The 1986 RAND study does not provide an estimate of the total direct loss to

tort victims. However, in 1991 RAND published a report titled "Compensation
for Accidental Injuries in the United States" (Hensler et al., 1991). This study
estimates the total monetary cost of nonfatal accidents to be $175.9 billion.
The $175.9 billion figure is the sum of $97.9 billion in "medical bills and other
expenses directly related to the accident" and $78 billion in lost earnings due to

the accident (Hensler et al., 1991: 103). The study does not provide a specific
year for this figure, but most of the data on which this estimate was based were

collected in the late 1980s (1987-89) (Hensler et al., 1991: 179. The $175.9
billion figure is an underestimate of the total monetary costs because it
t7

excludes costs for fatal accidental injuries.

16. For simplicity, we use the strict liability results derived earlier in this article. This seems
appropriate as an aggregate or system-wide multiplier. The negligence multiplier, derived in the
appendix, requires more information, and would seem to be appropriate in the case in which the
negligence ruleoperates inall disputes and the probability of a false conviction is low.
17. One way to correct this underestimate is to work backward from the total compensation
data. The 1986 RAND study puts total tort compensation at roughly $23 billion. The 1991 RAND
study puts total tort compensation at $15.7 billion, the lower figure reflecting the exclusion of
wrongful death, property damage only claims, and most occupational illness and toxic exposure
claims (see Hensler et al., 1991: 198). If we assume one-third of the difference is captured by the
wrongful death claims, and that all accidental deaths are compensated through lawsuits, then the
upward adjustment for fatal accidental injuries is roughly $2.6 billion. This would bring theestimate of the total direct harm to $178.5 billion. Since the adjustment is not substantial, we will use
the 1991 RAND estimate in the text.
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We can use the multiplier expressions derived earlier in this article to say
whether the existing multiplier of one is too large or too small under the criteria
developed. Consider first the optimal deterrence criterion. Recall that Equation
(13) shows that the optimal deterrence multiplier is equal to the ratio of the
total loss (direct harm plus victim litigation costs) to the internalized (through
lawsuits) portion of that loss. To be precise, if we let Z(md) represent the ratio
of the total loss to the internalized loss as a function of the multiplier, then the
optimal deterrence multiplier satisfies Z(m) = m*. Moreover, given the properties of Equation (13), if we choose some arbitrary m' such that m' < Z(md
we know that mo is less than the optimal level m*.' 8
It follows that if a multiplier of one were optimal on deterrence grounds (i.e.,
m* = 1), then the ratio of the total loss to the internalized loss would be equal
to one. In fact, given the existing multiplier of one, the ratio of the total loss to
the internalized loss is
$175.9 + $8 =
$23
The existing multiplier of one is apparently too low from an optimal deterrence
perspective. Assuming the properties of Equation (13) apply, a multiplier of
7.9 would be too large for optimal deterrence purposes. 19 If we move the multiplier up from one, the ratio of the total victim loss to the internalized victim
loss decreases. The optimal deterrence multiplier is therefore between 1 and
7.9. Taking the midpoint as the proxy, the optimal deterrence multiplier for the
whole tort system appears to be roughly 4.5.
The multiplier necessary to guarantee reasonable care, specified in Equation
(16), is equal to the ratio of the portion of the victim's direct loss that is
not effectively internalized by the injurer's defense costs to the internalized
portion of the victim's direct loss. We referred to this earlier as the injurer's
cost internalization ratio. The numerator of this ratio is the total direct loss
less the injurer's litigation costs. Using $175.9 billion as the estimate of
the total direct harm and the figures from Table I, the injurer's cost internalization ratio is
$175.9 -$9
$23

-

This suggests, again using the properties of Equation (13), that the existing
multiplier of one is too low to guarantee reasonable care. Taking the midpoint
between I and 7.3 as the estimate, the reasonable care multiplier suggested by
this is roughly 4.

18. This is because the sign of the slope of Z(m) is the same as the sign of {m - Z(m)}, see
supra note 8.
19. Again, recall the argument of note 9, supra. Plugging in the data, when m = 1, Z(m) = 7.9.
Since, by the argument of note 8, Z(m) is decreasing, the optimal deterrence multiplier, which
requires md = Z(md). must be less than 7.9.
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Now these large multiplier estimates, 4.5 and 4, are most likely biased upward. Even though the total direct harm figure does not include fatal injuries, it
is probably too large for this analysis because it includes losses that are covered
by liability insurance. We have in mind (1) workers compensation payments,
(2) employer disability, and (3) instances in which the liability insurer compensates the victim in the absence of a lawsuit. In these cases, the liability
insurance premiums may effectively internalize the direct harms to injurers,
and we would not see this internalization by simply looking at compensation
through lawsuits.
The 1991 RAND study (Hensler et al.) reports that roughly $35 billion was
transferred (on an annual basis) through worker's compensation and employer
disability programs. We have no figures for the amount transferred through
settlements by insurers in the absence of the filing of a claim. Reflecting
the prevalence of no-fault, some 63% of the total compensation for auto torts
reflects payments made in the absence of the filing of a lawsuit. 20 In contrast, in
medical malpractice, only 10% of the total compensation from liability insurance reflects claims paid without the filing of a lawsuit (Hensler et al., 1991:
22). Let us assume that 30% of the total compensation paid in liability insurance occurs without the filing of a lawsuit. 2 1 This would give us roughly $10
billion in payments made on liability claims without the filing of a lawsuit.
Summing these figures we arrive at $45 billion as the amount paid out in quick
settlements.
If we treat quick settlements as equivalent to lawsuits, then the estimate of
total compensation paid through lawsuits, [1 - H(c,)]E(vv > c,), should be
adjusted upward to $68 billion. 22 Using this figure, the adjusted optimal deterrence multiplier for the total tort system is found by examining the ratio of
the total loss to the internalized loss:
$175.9 + $8 -2.7.
$68
Using the same reasoning as in the previous cases, this suggests that the optimal deterrence multiplier for the total tort system is roughly two. The reasonable care multiplier is found by examining the injurer's cost internalization
ratio,
$175.9
- $68- $9

$68

2.4,

20. See Hensler et al. (1991: 21, estimating "'quicksettlements" for auto torts at $15.4 billion
and total compensation for auto torts at $24.4 billion, yielding a ratio of 63%.
21. To test the validity ofthis assumption, we conducted the same exercise on an alternative set
of figures (see footnote 23) and arrived at the same conclusion as under this assumption.
22. This is the sum of the $45 billion estimate for "quick settlements" and $23 billion estimate
for total compensation paid through lawsuits.
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which suggests that the reasonable care multiplier is roughly 1.5.23 Given the
upward bias suggested by Craswell (1999),24 this suggests that there is no need
to multiply tort awards in order to achieve reasonable care.

5.2 Auto Torts
The RAND studies allow us to take the same back-of-the-envelope approach to
auto tort litigation. The aggregate litigation cost for plaintiffs in auto torts is put
at $2.5 billion in the 1986 RAND study (Kakalik and Pace). The aggregate
litigation cost for auto tort defendants is put at roughly $2 billion. The aggregate amount paid out in compensation for lawsuits was $9 billion in 1985. This
paid out in comincludes settlements and trial verdicts. The aggregate amount
25
pensation (with or without lawsuits) was $24.4 billion.
We are not primarily interested in the amount paid out as compensation to
claimants, but in finding an estimate of the total direct loss. The 1991 RAND
study (Hensler et al.) reports the total direct monetary cost of motor vehicle
accidents to be $37 billion. Again, this is an underestimate because it excludes
fatal accidents.
How much of the $24.4 billion paid was internalized through lawsuits?
Obviously $9 billion was internalized. However, of the difference, $15.4 billion, some portion represents liability claims that were paid without the filing
of a lawsuit. Since a rational insurer would not voluntarily pay unless the claim
represented a credible lawsuit, we should treat the part of $15.4 billion consisting of third-party liability claims paid without a lawsuit as early (or quick)
settlements. To determine this portion we used the proportion of states that are
effectively "fault" regimes. This leads to an upward adjustment of the loss

23. We should note that an alternative set of figures could be used to arrive at our adjusted
multiplier estimates of 2 and 1.5. The 1986 RAND study (Kakalik and Pace) reports that a study
by Tillinghast says that $68 billion was spent on the U.S. tort system in 1984. The RAND study
notes that the $68 billion figure is higher than their high-end estimate of $35.6 billion because it
includes the cost of insurance premiums that "cover claims, lawsuits, and the operation of the
insurance system." To reach a figure that approximates total liability payments from insurers, deduct defense costs from Table 1, which are presumably included in the $68 billion. Using $9 billion
for defense costs, this leaves us $59 billion. If we take off 8% for administrative costs and profit, the
figure comes down to $54 billion. This figure presumably reflects claims paid for by insurers, including those that did and those that did not enter the tort system. Since $23 billion was paid to
compensate litigating tort victims, the remaining $31 billion can be taken as an estimate of liability
payments made in the absence of the filing of a lawsuit. This is less than our estimate of $45 billion.
However, taking $54 billion as the total internalized loss would yield an optimal deterrence multiplier estimate roughly the same as the adjusted estimate of two.
24. See especially, Equation (17), where we show that under a negligence rule, the reasonable
care multiplier is the product of the multiplier suggested by Craswell and the injurer's cost internalization ratio. Since the multiplier suggested by Craswell is generally less than one, using the injurer's
cost internalization ratio to estimate the reasonable care multiplier leads to an upward bias.
25. Although this is almost as large as the figure in Table I for total compensation for the entire
tort system, the two numbers should not be compared because the $24.4 billion auto tort figure
includes first-party payments and payments in the absence of a lawsuit.
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internalized through lawsuits from
the original figure of $9 billion to an
26
adjusted figure of $17.9 billion.
The optimal deterrence multiplier is equal to the ratio of the total victim
costs (direct injury loss plus litigation costs) to the internalized portion of that
loss (compensation paid). Evaluated at the existing multiplier, the ratio of the
total loss to the internalized loss is
$37 + $2.5

$17.9

-

2.2.

This suggests, under the reasoning of the previous discussion, that the optimal
deterrence multiplier for auto torts is roughly 1.6 (i.e., midway between 1 and 2.2).
The reasonable care multiplier is suggested by examining the ratio
$37-$2 - 1.9.
$17.9
Using the midpoint between 1 and 1.9 as the estimate, this suggests a reasonable care multiplier of 1.4. Given that this is biased upward (Craswell, 1999),
this analysis suggests no need to multiply auto tort awards in order to achieve
reasonable care.

5.3 Medical Malpractice
The 1986 RAND study (Kakalik and Pace) puts the aggregate litigation cost
for medical malpractice defendants in 1985 at $0.6 billion. The aggregate litigation cost for plaintiffs is roughly the same. The total compensation paid in
lawsuits for malpractice in 1985 was $1.69 billion. The total amount paid to
malpractice claimants (summing the amount paid in lawsuits and amount paid
without a lawsuit) was $1.88 billion. Since profit-maximizing insurers would
not have an incentive to voluntarily pay out on claims that could not form the
basis of a credible lawsuit, we should treat the total $1.88 billion as compensation paid in lawsuits.
Since neither the 1986 RAND study (Kakalik and Pace) nor the 1991 RAND
study (Hensler et al.) provide an estimate of the total direct loss to medical
malpractice victims, we had to reinterpret some of the data provided in the
1986 study to arrive at such an estimate. The study reports "losses incurred"
for 1985 as roughly $3.5 billion. This amount is equal to the sum of compensation paid out and the net change in reserves set aside for future claims.
26. As of 1989, 16 states were no-fault in the sense that they imposed thresholds that claims had
to exceed before allowing access to the courts. An additional nine states were "'add-on" states, in
the sense that the claimant could choose to forgo the no-fault plan and file a lawsuit instead. If we
treat the nine "add-on" states as half no-fault, then the effective percentage of no-fault states is
42%. If 42% of states can be characterized as "no-fault," we will assume that 58% of the $15.4
billion-$8.9 billion-consists of early settlements on third-party liability claims. The remaining
$6.5 billion is assumed to represent first-party claims. Adding $8.9 billion to the compensation paid
in lawsuits changes the amount internalized through liability suits from $9 billion to $17.9 billion.
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We decided to treat losses incurred as a proxy for the direct losses to victims.
After deducting 35% of the differential between "losses incurred" and total
compensation paid (1.88 billion) to estimate money set aside to cover litigation
costs, 2 7 we arrived at an estimate of a direct loss of $2.9 billion. Although this
may seem large in comparison to "compensation paid," the literature on medical malpractice litigation suggests that the majority of potentially valid malpractice claims never materialize as lawsuits (Weiler et al., 1993). Insurers
have records documenting the existence of these potential claims and set
aside reserves to meet them, though probably not under the assumption that
they will pay 100% of these claims.
Using $2.9 billion as our estimate of the total direct loss, the optimal deterrence multiplier is suggested by the ratio of the total loss to the total internalized loss:
$2.9 + $.6 -____
1.86.
$1.88
Assuming, as in the previous cases, that the relationship between the multiplier
and the ratio of the total to the internalized loss has properties that allow us to
move step by step toward the solution, the optimal deterrence multiplier for
medical malpractice appears to be roughly 1.4. We will interpret this as an
indication that multiplying damages is unnecessary for optimal deterrence purposes in medical malpractice.
The reasonable care multiplier is found by examining the ratio of the direct
harm net the injurer's litigation cost to the total internalized loss:
$2.9 - $.6
$1.88

1.2.

This ratio suggests, if we take the midpoint between 1 and 1.2 as the solution,
that the reasonable care multiplier is probably less than and at most equal to 1.
There appears to be no case for multiplying damages in order to guarantee
reasonable care in the medical malpractice context. Litigation defense costs
effectively internalize-indeed, probably overinternalize-the direct monetary harm suffered by medical malpractice victims who fail to bring legal
claims.
These results are biased upward to the extent that they ignore the fact that
insurance premiums partially internalize the losses of victims who do not bring
suit. However, the results are biased downward to the extent that they fail to
incorporate information on the claimants whose losses are too small to form
the basis of a credible lawsuit. Presumably insurers discount these claims and
do not incorporate them as costs that must be covered by insurance premiums.
We are unable to say which bias dominates.

27. Note that the ratio of defendant costs to compensation paid is0.6/1.69 = 0.35. We assume
this ratio holds for amounts setaside in anticipation of future payouts by the insurer.
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6. Summary and Implications
The "multiplier principle" (the "lip" approach), that damages should be multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of punishment, has been accepted as
one of the basic lessons of the law and economics literature. The foregoing
discussion explores the principle in the private damages setting instead of
the more common framework of analysis in which a public enforcement
agency has to choose the optimal penalty. Our treatment points to three types
of multipliers that courts could apply in the torts setting: an optimal deterrence
multiplier that brings about first-best deterrence, a socially optimal multiplier
that minimizes overall social costs, and a reasonable care multiplier that guarantees compliance with the negligence standard.
In theory the optimal deterrence multiplier could assume any positive value
greater than one, depending on the size of litigation costs. Moreover, the optimal deterrence multiplier increases as litigation costs rise relative to the average direct harm. If the ratio of litigation costs to the average direct damage
were sufficiently high, the optimal deterrence approach could be used tojustify
multipliers well in excess of the doubling or trebling rules observed in state and
federal statutes.
In contrast, the socially optimal multiplier is always less than the optimal
deterrence multiplier and decreases toward zero as the ratio of litigation costs
to direct harm increases. Our simulation results suggest that the socially optimal multipliers will often be below the doubling or trebling levels, and sometimes less than one.
Our efforts to get rough empirical estimates of the optimal deterrence multipliers suggest comparatively modest levels in relation to the potentially
large multiplier suggested by the theoretical analysis. The optimal deterrence
multiplier for the whole tort system appears to be roughly 2, and that for
auto torts roughly 1.5. Given that half of all tort filings involve auto accidents,
one should not be surprised to find that the optimal deterrence multipliers
for the whole system and for auto torts are close. In contrast, the medical
malpractice data suggest no need to multiply awards in order to guarantee
optimal deterrence.
The optimal deterrence multipliers suggested by the empirical application
are lower than one would expect on the basis of a simplistic application of the
"1/p" approach. This intuitive approach would divide the harm by the probability of liability. Since the probability of liability cannot be greater than the
probability that a suit is filed, the reciprocal of the probability of a lawsuit
might be taken, under this approach, as a lower bound on the appropriate multiplier. Although the United States is known as a litigious country, the data
show that claims are relatively infrequent events in relation to the base of injuries that give rise to them. The 1991 RAND study (Hensler et al., 1991: 120-21)
estimates that roughly 1 injury in 10 leads to an attempt to collect liability
compensation; in other words, a lawsuit probability of .10. The straightforward 1 p approach would suggest a multiplier of at least 10 for the tort
system, which is far too high.
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The empirical application gives a new perspective on the role of insurance.
Some commentators have suggested that insurance should be abolished
because it dilutes incentives to take care. Others have noted that insurance enhances incentives to take care by financing the monitoring of care levels and
providing signals to potential injurers that relate the price of insurance to their
care levels. The empirical application here suggests that a significant degree of
internalization occurs directly through insurance or insurance-like (e.g., workers compensation) contracts, thus bypassing the courts. In the absence of such
contracts, many of the injured parties would have to seek compensation
through the tort system. Since litigation is costly, a substantial number of these
claimants would not have an incentive to bring suit. Moreover, among the
claimants who file suit, their targets would be limited to large, financially
sound (deep-pocket) entities. Given this, the insurance system plays an important role in directly channeling costs to actors who are in the best position to
control them.
The central normative question generated by this analysis is whether we
should prefer the optimal deterrence to the socially optimal multiplier. The
question is equivalent to asking whether we would prefer to live in a world
with fewer accidental injuries, but a lower standard of living. One could justify
a preference for the optimal deterrence multiplier on the grounds that people
are risk averse, and therefore would prefer, between the two multipliers, the
one that minimizes the risk of accidental injury. The ideal tort system minimizes the sum of primary (injury), secondary (risk spreading), and tertiary (administrative and litigation) costs (Calabresi, 1970). A case could be made that
the optimal deterrence multiplier comes closest to this objective.
However, the Calabresi argument for full internalization has an arbitrary
feel to it. There is no way to show that people are sufficiently risk averse
to justify the choice of the low-risk, safe regime. Moreover, in a world in which
people are free to insure themselves against the risk of accidental injury, there
is no uncontested case for compelling adoption of the safe regime.
Another approach to justifying a preference for the optimal deterrence multiplier is to rely on some version of the Aristotelian corrective justice framework. The corrective justice approach is equivalent to assuming an ordering of
preferences in which the righting of wrongs through compensation is given the
first priority. Since one is free to choose the definition of a wrong under this
model (Posner, 1983: 73-74), one could say that the injurer has committed
a wrong when he violates the negligence standard or some more stringent test
based on "causation., 28 Between the socially optimal multiplier and the optimal deterrence multiplier, it should be clear that the corrective justice approach would choose the latter. To be sure, this approach is no less
arbitrary than one based on risk aversion.

28. The "causation" standard (strict liability) is urged in Epstein (1973).
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7. Conclusion
The notion that damages should be scaled up by dividing by the probability of
punishment is one of the basic lessons from the economic analysis of law.
While the idea has been developed further in the economic analysis of criminal
law, relatively little effort has been applied to specifying multipliers for deterrence in the civil damages setting. This article sets out to fill this gap in the
literature. The simple "lip" multiplier suggested by Bentham (1781) turns
out to be inapplicable in the civil damages setting. The multiplier that brings
about first-best deterrence must be chosen by striking a balance between the
supply of lawsuits and the need for internalization of costs. Moreover, given
the costs of litigation, the multiplier that minimizes overall social costs will be
less than the one that brings about first-best deterrence, and may need to be set
at a level that effectively bars many claims.

Appendix
In this appendix we examine the optimal deterrence multiplier under negligence. We will start with a review of basic results on compliance with the
negligence rule.
Injurers face socially inadequate incentives for care under a negligence test
based on the Hand formula (which holds the defendant negligent if he failed to
take care when x < (p - q)E(v)). As Ordover (1978) showed, when litigation
is costly, equilibrium under a negligence rule must involve some injurers who
fail to meet the care standard. If this were not the case, victims would never file
suit (assuming the Hand test is applied without error), which would be inconsistent with injurers' compliance with the care standard. Thus, in equilibrium,
some victims file suit and some injurers are found negligent. But since the
standard of care set by the Hand test is too low in a world of costly litigation,
injurers face inadequate incentives for care. If the Hand test is applied with
error, greater compliance with the care standard is possible (indeed, some
overcompliance may occur), but the equilibrium must still involve underdeterrence (Hylton, 1990a).
In view of these results, we examine the use of damage multipliers to
achieve optimal deterrence when litigation is costly. Although negligence
underdeters both with and without legal error, we show that use of a multiplier
is feasible only when there is error. Further, the negligence multiplier, when
feasible, will always be larger than the strict liability multiplier.
Assume, as in Hylton (1990a,b) that the negligence standard is defined by
the Hand test. In the context of the current model, this means that an injurer
will be found negligent if he failed to take care and the court determines
that his cost of care is less than the expected savings in damages; that is,
if X < (p - q)E(v). Injurers for whom this condition holds are said to be
"potentially negligent."
As noted above, it turns out that a multiplier can be used to achieve optimal
deterrence under negligence only if the Hand test is applied with error (we will
show this below). Therefore, let 01 be the probability of a type 1 error (the
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probability that the court finds a negligent defendant nonnegligent), and let 02
be the probability of a type 2 error (the probability that the court finds a nonnegligent injurer negligent). 29 Although the court makes errors, we assume it is
sufficiently accurate that
1 -01

(A.1)

>02.

This says that a negligent injurer is more likely to be found negligent than is
a nonnegligent injurer.
An accident victim will file suit under negligence if wvmN > ci,, where w is
defined to be the probability that the injurer will be found negligent, and mN is
the negligence multiplier. Thus if an accident occurs, the probability of a suit
is 1 - H(cV/wnzN). We assume that, although victims do not know if a given
injurer is negligent (i.e., they do not observe his care choice), they correctly
perceive the probability of a negligent verdict, including the possibility of legal
error. Thus
w =s( -0 1)+(1 -s)02 = 02+(1 -O0 - 02)s,

(A.2)

where s is the probability that the injurer is truly negligent-that is, he is both
potentially negligent and fails to take care. 30
A potentially negligent injurer (one for whom x < (p - q)E(v)) will take
care if
(0 2 mNv + ci)dH(v) < p./wmp ((1 - O )mNv + ci)dH(v),

x+jq

x< [p(l -01)

mNVdH() + (p - q)

- q02]
× C,/wmiN

(A.3)
An injurer who is not potentially negligent (one for whom x > (p - q)E(v))
will take care if
x +qf

Im

(02mNv

+ ci)dH(v) < P

f

°
WMi

(02mNv +

c,)dH(v)

or if
x < (p

-

q)

WM(02mNV

+ ci)dH(v) =- B(mN).

(A.4)

29. We assume, following Png (1987), Polinsky and Shavell (1989), and Hylton (1990a), that
both probabilities are constant.
30. Since victims correctly perceive the probability of a negligent verdict, they calculate s using Bayes' rule (see Hylton, 1990a). It will turn out, however, that in an efficient equilibrium, s = 0.
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Note from Equation (A.3) that the incentive for care by potentially negligent
injurers is reduced by an increase in both types of errors. In contrast, Equation
(A.4) shows that incentives for care by injurers who are not potentially negligent are unaffected by type 1 errors, but are actually enhanced by an increase
in type 2 errors. This is because injurers who are not potentially negligent can
never be found incorrectly nonnegligent, but they do face the possibility of
being found incorrectly negligent. This reduces the benefit of failing to take
care.
As under strict liability, injurers ignore the damages to victims who do not
file suit as well as the litigation costs of those who do. Thus the social condition
for care under negligence is given by
X < (p - q){E(v) + [I - H(cv/WmN)1(c,, +

Ci)} -S(mN).

(A.5)

The objective is to set the negligence multiplier so that all injurers for whom
Equation (A.5) is satisfied actually take care. Since the right-hand side of
Equation (A.5) exceeds (p - q)E(v), it follows that all potentially negligent
injurers, as well as some who are not potentially negligent, should take care.
This is true because the Hand rule, which determines potential negligence,
ignores litigation costs, which increase the socially desirable level of care.
Thus, in an efficient equilibrium, it must be the case that s = 0. That is, no
injurers are truly negligent according to the Hand rule. As a result, Equation
(A.2) implies that w = 02, which says that the only findings of negligence by
the court are erroneous ones. This is a consequence of the fact, noted above,
that when litigation is costly, a negligence equilibrium without legal error must
underdeter (Ordover, 1978; Hylton, 1990b).
The fact that, in an efficient equilibrium, the marginal caretaker must be an
injurer who is not potentially negligent implies that the relevant equation for
deriving the negligence multiplier is S(mN) = B(mN). 31 After setting w = 02
and rearranging, this equation can be written

MN02

fN02

1

)2

IV

MN02
c(,
dH(v) = E(v)

(A.6)

or
F(mN02) = E(v).

(A.6')

Comparing this equation to Equation (9) in the text implies
MS = mN02, ormN = mS/02.

(A.7)

Since 02 is between zero and one, mN > ms. Thus the negligence multiplier is
larger than the strict liability multiplier, all else being equal.

31. Note that A(mN) > B(mN). Thus, in an efficient equilibrium, all potentially negligent
injurers will take care as well.
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Figure 3. Negligence multiplier.

A further implication of Equation (A.7) is that
OmN
002

-9N= mAN8
M < 0.

(A.8)

02

Thus the negligence multiplier decreases as the probability of type 2 error
increases (see Figure 3). This reflects the fact that type 2 errors enhance deterrence for injurers who are not potentially negligent, and therefore move the
equilibrium closer to the optimum. Equation (A.7) also implies that if 02 = 1,
the optimally deterring negligence and strict liability multipliers are identical.
In this case, negligence in effect becomes a strict liability because taking care
does not act as a shield from liability.
At the other extreme, as 02 -- 0, the negligence multiplier becomes infinite.
This reflects the fact that in a world without legal error, no injurers who are not
potentially negligent can be induced to take care because they will never be
found negligent by the court. Thus the multiplier cannot be applied to them. In
theory, a negligence multiplier could still improve deterrence by being set to
induce all potentially negligent injurers to take care (some of whom do not do
so in equilibrium), but, as noted above, this would not be sufficient to achieve
optimal compliance, given that the care standard set by the Hand rule is too low
(i.e., a perfect compliance equilibrium is suboptimal). Moreover, it would simply restore the problem of nonexistence of an equilibrium in which there is
perfect compliance.
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